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NOTABLE STUDENT WORKS
The Mentally Disabled in the Institution
and the Community: An Overview of the
Difficulties of Psychiatric Care
I. Introduction
This composition addresses two distinct issues concerning the
mentally disabled. Although each of the issues has a different focus,
they are together because of the continuum created from the institu-
tion to the community and the importance of each issue to the men-
tally disabled in that particular setting.
The mentally disabled's right to treatment in an institution is
addressed in Section II. The right to treatment is not an outright
constitutional guarantee. Treatment for the mentally disabled is en-
hanced by other rights, discussed further in the Article, which are
guaranteed by the Constitution. These constitutional rights can be
legally protected. Protection may take the form of either a civil law-
suit pursuant to section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code,
or a suit initiated by the United States Justice Department through
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. Each route has dif-
ficulties that must be overcome if litigation is to be successful. For
the practitioner, this Section will discuss the history of the right to
treatment, its current status, and the strategic difficulties to consider
in selecting a forum to protect a resident's rights in the institution.
Section III focuses on the ability of the mentally disabled to
obtain zoning approval for group homes. Group homes allow the
mentally disabled to receive treatment in a community living ar-
rangement (CLA). Zoning approval is often needed, however, before
a group home can operate. Typically, approval has been obtained for
group homes in one of three ways. First, the home is considered the
equivalent of a family unit and operates as a matter of right. Second,
certain zoning options applied for by the home, such as special ex-
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ceptions or variances, compel approval in some circumstances. Third,
the approval is granted because the zoning ordinance is unconstitu-
tional. For the practitioner, this Article provides Pennsylvania case
law on each approach and highlights the distinctions between the
two zoning options frequently confused by zoning boards and advo-
cates alike.
Additionally, Section III discusses and distinguishes a 1986
Commonwealth Court case that addresses the issue of an apartment
CLA for the mentally disabled. The case addresses this alternative
CLA's attempt to obtain zoning approval. Significantly, the path-
ways used to obtain zoning approval for group homes can also be
applied to zoning issues raised by alternative CLA's, such as this
apartment building. This is important for the practitioner because
alternative CLAs are increasing in frequency, as group homes did in
the early 1970s. Consequently, alternative CLAs should be prepared
to meet the public's resistance and hesitancy to approve zoning for
this form of treatment for the mentally disabled.
In sum, the right of the mentally disabled to receive treatment
in any setting is not, as of yet, a constitutional guarantee. In an insti-
tution, however, the right to receive treatment is directly benefitted
by other constitutional rights. Similarly, in the community, the men-
tally disabled's right to receive treatment is supported by the ability
to obtain zoning approval for group homes. Zoning approval may not
be automatic, but the mentally disabled's right to this approval, and
ultimately to treatment in the community, is also supported by the
constitutional protections of the fourteenth amendment.
II. A Constitutional Right to Treatment: Does it Really Matter?
A. Historical Perspective
Institutions for the mentally disabled became widely accepted in
the early nineteenth century. Therapeutic treatment consisted of pro-
viding a retreat type environment for the mentally ill.' Although the
idea of a nondemanding, humanitarian environment was beneficial to
many, patients with long term psychiatric problems often did not re-
spond. Consequently, the asylums became crowded with chronic pa-
tients and the ability to therapeutically rehabilitate the mentally dis-
abled dwindled.2 At the same time, commitment standards were
I. Goldman & Morrissey, Cycles of Reform in the Care of the Chronically Ill, 8 Hospi-
tal & Community Psychiatry 786 (1984).
2. Id. at 787.
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being liberalized, further compounding the congestion within the in-
stitutions.3 Staff shortages, in conjunction with overcrowding, effec-
tively made custodial care the prime concern of the institution,
thereby relegating therapeutic humane treatment to a subordinate
position.
This focus on custodial care set the stage for a silent repudiation
of a mentally disabled individual's rights. Unfortunately, the men-
tally disabled were often unaware and unable to effectively protect
and assert their rights and procure a more humane environment in
the process. This discouraging predicament came to the public's at-
tention through litigation and media efforts and prompted some re-
form within the institutions. Notably, Congress passed an advisory
bill of rights for mental health patients.' Although this is not
mandatory upon the states,' it is a recognition that "Iclitizens re-
ceiving mental health care have the same rights as all other citi-
zens." 7 More importantly, it conveyed "the importance of building a
strong patients-rights and consumer perspective into any reforms in
the service system."'
The rights enumerated within 42 U.S.C. section 9501 encom-
pass constitutional guarantees as well as model legal rights to be
considered by state legislatures. Although the Bill of Rights was ini-
tially supported by a federal "advocacy program to enforce the state-
granted rights,"9 budget cuts in 1981 repealed that portion of the
Mental Health Systems Act."0 Consequently, there remain two path-
ways by which a mentally disabled individual's constitutional rights
can be protected - either by federal government involvement pursu-
ant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 1 or a cause
3. E. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw 6 (1984).
4. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note I at 787.
5. Bill of Rights (Mental Health Systems Act of 1980) § 501, Pub. L. No. 96-398, 94
Stat. 1598 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9501 (1981)).
6. The advisory status of the Bill of Rights was justified on the basis of states rights and
a perception that thirty-five states already had the provisions set forth by the act. Actually,
data show substantial compliance with the Bill of Rights' major recommendations by only
twenty-two states. See Lyon, Levine & Zusman, Patients' Bill of Rights: A Survey of State
Statutes, 6 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 178 (1982) [hereinafter Patients' Bill of Rights].
7. S. REP. No. 712, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3372, 3403.
8. Id.
9. See Patients' Bill of Rights, supra note 6.
10. Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, § 502, Pub. L. No. 96-398, 94 Stat. 1601
repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, § 902 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
560.
II. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat.
349, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1981)).
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of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.12
B. Protection of the Mentally Disabled's Constitutional Rights by
a § 1983 Claim
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. section
1983, permits an individual to seek redress in the court system when
there has been "a deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution."13 The Supreme Court recognized that
the violation of a constitutional right was compensable and actiona-
ble in Monroe v. Pape." However, to bring an action pursuant to
section 1983, a second hurdle must be met - the deprivation of the
constitutional right must be by an individual who is acting "under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State." 15 Consequently, a mentally disabled person confined within a
state mental health institution who .suffers constitutional violations
meets the basic requirements needed to bring a section 1983 claim,
namely a constitutional violation that occurs under a state law.
The majority of civil rights cases brought by mental patients"
pertain to violations of their fourteenth amendment rights.1 7 The lib-
erty interest, in particular, has been the subject of much litigation
and argued as encompassing several treatment rights. Yet, the right
to treatment itself has not been declared an outright guarantee af-
12. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, R.S. § 1979, which is currently found at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
16. The term "mental patients" encompasses mentally ill and mentally retarded individ-
uals, and is used interchangeably with the term "mentally disabled."
17. First amendment rights have been secured by many state legislatures. See E. BEIs,
supra note 3 at 344-45. The eighth amendment is not applicable to individuals civilly commit-
ted, but the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in a civil context is encom-
passed by the fourteenth amendment's liberty interest. See, Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d
147, 156 (1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The thirteenth amendment
prohibition against involuntary servitude has been addressed by several state legislatures and
the United States Congress. Work performed by a mental patient is to be compensated accord-
ing to the FLSA requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 529.1-17 (1981). The fourteenth
amendment, however, is an appropriate vehicle by which a civilly committed mentally ill per-
son can bring a civil rights claim. U.S. CONST. amend. XI, § I, states "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... "
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forded by the constitution.' 8
A constitutional right to treatment 9 was first alluded to by
Judge Bazelon in Rouse v. Cameron.0 Rouse had been acquitted of
a misdemeanor by reason of insanity and had then been confined to a
mental institution until he no longer required hospitalization. 2' He
filed a habeas corpus petition contesting his confinement on the basis
that he was not receiving treatment and could conceivably be con-
fined forever.22 Although the court held that Rouse had a right to
treatment, the basis of that right was statutory in nature. Neverthe-
less, the court made reference to the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess guarantee.2 8
A constitutional right to treatment was confronted in two
landmark mental health cases handled by the Fifth Circuit, Wyatt v.
Aderholt2" and Donaldson v. O'Connor.5 Donaldson had been a psy-
chiatric patient at a mental institution for fourteen and a half
years. 26 Despite the fact that Donaldson was not dangerous to him-
self or others, his numerous requests for grounds privileges, occupa-
tional therapy, and release to persons who could care for him were
denied.27 He then brought this suit seeking his constitutional right to
receive treatment or his release.
The Fifth Circuit held that Donaldson had a constitutional right
to receive treatment. The court reasoned as follows:
[Tihe conclusion that the due process clause guarantees a
right to treatment rests upon a two-part theory. The first part
begins with the fundamental, and all but universally accepted,
proposition that "any nontrivial governmental abridgement of
[any] freedom [which is part of the 'liberty' the Fourteenth
Amendment says shall not be denied without due process of law]
must be justified in terms of some 'permissible governmental
goal.'"
• . . the first part of the theory of a due process right to
treatment is that where, as in Donaldson's case, the rationale for
18. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
19. The term "treatment" is recognized by the Court as a difficult term to define. In one
instance it may mean training, in another it may mean habilitation, and in another, it may
pertain to an illness. Id. at 309 n. I. This factor, in and of itself, makes this a particularly gray
area in the law. See also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1306 n.I (1974).
20. 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 453.
23. Id.
24. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
25. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
26. Id. at 509.
27. Id. at 512.
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confinement is the "parens patriae" rationale that the patient is
in need of treatment, the due process clause requires that mini-
mally adequate treatment be in fact provided.
. ..As Judge Johnson expressed in the Wyatt case: "To
deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic the-
ory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and
then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very funda-
mentals of due process."
' * * In Jackson, the Supreme Court established the rule
that "[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purposes for which the individual is committed. 8
The Fifth Circuit employed this line of reasoning again in Wy-
att v. Aderholta9 later that same year. Wyatt was a class action suit
representing the Alabama state mental institutions and a mental re-
tardation facility. The focus of the litigation became the goal of ob-
taining adequate, competent treatment,3 0 as opposed to continuing
the operation of a facility geared toward the long term storage of
persons.3" The court, citing its Donaldson decision, endorsed the no-
tion of a constitutional right to treatment and held that the individ-
ual's liberty interest outweighed any state interest met by the mere
provision of custodial care while confined in a mental facility."
Although the Fifth Circuit easily found a constitutional right to
treatment, the Supreme Court of the United States did not. The
Court granted certiorari in the case of Donaldson v. O'Connor but
subsequently vacated without truly addressing the right to treatment
issue.3 3 Instead, the Court addressed the less difficult liberty interest
and held that a "[sitate cannot constitutionally confine without more
a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in free-
dom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends." '3 4 To confine such a person would deprive them
of their physical liberty and cannot be constitutionally justified.3 5
28. Id. at 520-21 (citations omitted).
29. 503 F.2d at 1305.
30. Id. at 1308.
31. Id. at 1313. This description of the Alabama facilities was given by Dr. Gunnar
Dybwad, a witness at the trial. He purposely used the word storage, rather than custody. Dr.
Dybwad felt custody implied an element of safekeeping, which he failed to find at the facili-
ties. Id.
32. Id. at 1312.
33. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
34. Id. at 576. See infra note 80 for a discussion of a conceivable right to treatment for
the committed mentally ill individual.
35. Id.
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Although the difficult question of whether a constitutional right
to treatment existed was skirted by the Donaldson Court, Youngberg
v. Romeo 6 forced the Court to confront the issue again. Romeo, a
thirty-three year old man, was committed to Pennhurst3 7 by his
mother who could no longer care for him at home. He was severely
retarded, having a mental capacity of an eighteen month old child. 88
While Romeo was at Pennhurst, he was injured on at least sixty-
three occasions by his own violence or that of other residents in re-
sponse to his behavior. 9 His mother filed a complaint seeking dam-
ages from the state officials charging that they knew or should have
known about the injuries Romeo suffered but failed to protect him.
This complaint was then amended seeking damages for the pro-
longed restraint of Romeo' 0 and the failure to provide treatment for
his mental retardation.
The jury verdict favored the state officials and Romeo's mother
appealed. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case.42 It
found the appropriate basis for asserting a constitutional right to
freedom of movement, freedom in personal security or safety, and an
interest in habilitation to "treat" mental retardation in the four-
teenth amendment.4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari."
The Court was quick to recognize the right to safe conditions as
a "historic liberty interest" not affected by lawful confinement."5
Likewise, the right to be free from bodily restraints was affirmed as
the "'core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action.' "46 The Court did not dispense with
the right to training as readily.
36. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
37. Pennhurst was a state school for the mentally retarded. It was the subject of a class
action suit. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), rear-
gued, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
38. 457 U.S. at 309.
39. Id. at 310.
40. Id. at 311. The restraints were characterized below as shackles, but they were actu-
ally soft restraints that were used on the patient's arms.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 312.
43. The district court utilized the eighth amendment as the applicable standard in evalu-
ating Romeo's allegation of the use of bodily restraints as cruel and unusual punishment. The
Third Circuit, however, used the fourteenth amendment as the appropriate starting point of
the analysis. The court of appeals cited Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) and Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) to support the premise that the eighth amendment is not appli-
cable in a non-criminal context. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated
and remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
44. Romeo v. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
45. 457 U.S. at 315.
46. Id. at 316 (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)).
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The Court recognized Romeo's right to training,47 but only as it
was "necessary to avoid unconstitutional infringement[s]" of his
right to safety and his right to be free from undue restraint. 8 The
Court explained the standard to be applied if this aspect of the lib-
erty interest was violated. The Court further noted that the liberty
interest was not an absolute right and that it needed to be balanced
against the legitimate interests of the State. 9
To determine if the conditions of safety and freedom from re-
straint were reasonable when balanced against the state's interests,
the Court instructed lower courts to "show deference to the judg-
ment exercised by a qualified professional."50 This deference to the
judgment of a professional was an effort to avoid "interference by
the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institu-
tions."'" This standard made the decision of the professional "pre-
sumptively valid," and liability was only to be found if the decision
was "a substantial departure from dccepted professional judgment,
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible
actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.
52
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and O'Connor concurred in the
Youngberg majority decision not to impose affirmative duties on the
state to provide treatment or training beyond that necessary to pro-
tect constitutional rights. Significantly, Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence recognized two unresolved issues and explained how the right
to treatment or training may be constitutionally required. He
surmised that treatment may be necessary in situations where an in-
dividual is committed for both "care and treatment" or where an
individual may require treatment, in the form of training, to prevent
the deterioration and loss of self care skills possessed on admission.
Where "care and treatment" are the reasons for commitment, Jus-
tice Blackmun postulated that treatment is needed so that confine-
ment will bear a reasonable relation to its purpose.5 3 Justice Black-
mun's reasoning is based on the standard set forth in Jackson v.
Indiana5 4 that "due process requires that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
47. "Training" is equivalent to "treatment" for the mentally retarded. See, Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 309 n.1, 311 n.5.
48. 457 U.S. at 318.
49. Id. at 321.
50. Id. at 322.
51. Id
52. Id. at 323.
53. Id. at 326.
54. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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the individual is committed." 55 Justice Blackmun also proposed that
a loss of self care skills due to the state's refusal to provide training
could significantly jeopardize an individual's liberty and was a loss
"quite distinct from - and as serious as - the loss of safety and
freedom from unreasonable restraints.""
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Youngberg was readily ac-
knowledged by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Society for
Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo.57 In Cuomo, a class of
mentally retarded individuals sought injunctive and declaratory re-
lief to improve conditions within state facilities, thereby allowing res-
idents to live in the least restrictive environment possible. Although
the district court's decree was characterized as commendable, it ex-
ceeded constitutional limitations in certain areas." The right to
training specified by the decree was upheld on appeal.
The Cuomo court recognized that the Youngberg majority had
"declined to rule on whether involuntarily committed mentally re-
tarded individuals had a constitutional right to any more training
than was necessary to secure freedom from undue restraint and the
right to safe conditions, because plaintiff Romeo had abandoned any
such claims to training." 5' Consequently, the Cuomo court adopted
Justice Blackmun's view from Youngberg and held that residents
have a "due process right to training sufficient to prevent basic self
care skills from deteriorating."' 0 The Cuomo decision specifically
states that this does not extend the right to training beyond basic
self-care skills or skills geared toward protecting basic liberty inter-
ests. Furthermore, the court cautioned that, even if state law re-
quired more with regard to the type of treatment, the federal court
was without jurisdiction to determine if that treatment was below
state standards."
The degree to which the right to treatment is encompassed by
the liberty interest of the fourteenth amendment is unsettled. 2 With
little direction from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts are apply-
55. Id. at 325 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
56. Id. at 327.
57. 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).
58. Id. at 1242.
59. Id. at 1249. See also Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318 n.l.
60. 737 F.2d at 1250.
61. Id. at 1250.
62. 457 U.S. at 307, remains the most recent Supreme Court decision on the right to
treatment. Further direction does not appear to be forthcoming in the near future as a recent
case involving a mentally retarded person and her liberty interest to a right to training was
denied certiorari. Clark v. Cohen, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 459 denying cert. to 794 F.2d 79
(3d Cir. 1986).
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ing Youngberg in various fashions.13 Clark v. Cohen,6" a Third Cir-
cuit case, recognized a violation of Clark's procedural and substan-
tive liberty interests, granted injunctive relief that included the right
to receive training to acquire skills to live in an unstructured envi-
ronment, and explained how it's decision was consistent with
Youngberg.
Clark was a forty-three year old mentally retarded woman who
had been institutionalized for twenty-eight years since the age of fif-
teen. Despite her requests and recommendations by the professional
staff that she be transferred to a community living arrangement
(CLA), she remained confined in the institution. Alleging that her
confinement had resulted in her inability to function in an unstruc-
tured environment, Clark sought short term placement in a commu-
nity living arrangement.6
The trial court held that Clark "had been deprived of her lib-
erty without procedural due process and of substantive liberty inter-
ests guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment." 6 An order was then
entered requiring the defendants to conform to previous settlement
arrangements. The settlement consisted of placing Clark in a CLA
and the payment of costs by the defendants. The defendants ap-
pealed, seeking to avoid payment of the costs attendant to placing
Clark in a CLA.67 Clark's placement in a CLA was to include train-
ing to enable her to function in that unstructured environment. The
court found that her right to receive training within the CLA was
consistent with Youngberg.6 8 Because the opinion of the professional
staff was that Clark should have been placed in a CLA, the court
determined that Clark's continued confinement in the institution was
unreasonable." Instead, she should be placed in a less restrictive en-
vironment (A CLA) and receive training "to facilitate [her] ability
to function free from bodily restraints."7
The Clark majority affirmed the trial court decision and found
that the eleventh amendment did not bar the relief ordered. 7' The
63. Note, Protecting Liberty Interests: Developments In Vermont's Mental Health Law
As Federal Constitutional Protection Declines, 9 VT. L. REv. 265, 273 (1984).
64. 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 81.
66. Id. at 82.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 87.
69. Id. at 79.
70. 457 U.S. at 324.
71. The eleventh amendment prohibits the award of relief that would compensate for
past injuries. Relief must be prospective in nature and the manner in which it affects the state
treasury must be ancillary to the relief granted. The Clark court recognized the relief granted
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concurrence by Judge Becker72 explained why he believed the elev-
enth amendment barred the relief granted. Nevertheless, he modified
the nondeterioration principle73 of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Youngberg to justify Clark's right to receive training. Recognizing
that the development of self care skills by individuals institutional-
ized at an early age may be hampered by that confinement, Judge
Becker endorsed the view that individuals who are committed at an
early age have a right to treatment sufficient to develop their self
care skills to the level they would have reached if they had not been
institutionalized. 7'
As in Cuomo and Clark, the right to treatment announced in
Youngberg pertained to a mentally retarded resident of a state facil-
ity. The right to treatment of a mentally ill individual, however, does
not necessarily equate with that which continues to evolve for the
mentally retarded. This difference was noted by Judge Dorsey in
Parillo v. Sura76 when he granted a summary judgment in favor of
the state officials.76 Parillo was a mentally ill patient at a Connecti-
cut state hospital. He was committed because he could not care for
himself and was dangerous to himself. Parillo was discharged at his
request and subsequently hanged himself and died. His representa-
tive brought this suit alleging a deprivation of life without due pro-
cess because Parillo did not receive psychiatric treatment."
Judge Dorsey recognized that the Supreme Court had not spo-
ken regarding the constitutional right to treatment for a committed
mentally ill person. Thus, the law was not clearly established. Judge
Dorsey explained that Harlow v. Fitzgeral78 dictated a summary
judgment for the defendants since "their conduct [did] not violate
as compensatory but noted that " 'they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring
about the delayed benefits .... '. Clark 794 F.2d at 84 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 at 289-90 (1977) (footnotes omitted)).
72. 794 F.2d at 87-98.
73. The name non-deterioration principle was given by Judge Becker. Id. at 96. The
principle refers to Justice Blackmun's suggestion that training may be necessary to prevent the
loss of self care skills possessed by an individual when admitted to an institution. Such training
guards against loss of liberty and is distinctly different from guaranteeing freedom from undue
restraint. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 327.
74. 794 F.2d at 96. To date no courts have adopted this suggested expansion of the right
to treatment.
75. 652 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Conn. 1987).
76. Judge Dorsey states in his opinion that the officials were sued in their official capaci-
ties. Id. at 1519. Harlow, however, only applies to officials who were sued for acting within
their personal capacities. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This may be a
mistake within the opinion or possibly an overlooked approach to countering the summary
judgment motion.
77. Parillo, 652 F. Supp. at 1518.
78. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known."79 Furthermore, he reasoned that
the limited constitutional right to treatment, recognized by Donald-
son,80 could not be extended to persons committed because they were
dangerous or unable to care for themselves.8" The rights recognized
in Youngberg did not apply to Parillo because the right to be free
from unreasonable restraints and to be safe were not at issue.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald's82 requirement that a summary judgment
be granted to the government official if the law is not clearly estab-
lished makes it practically impossible to establish the right to treat-
ment in a case against an official in his personal capacity. The possi-
bility of establishing such a right against a municipal or state official
defendant is also slim. Monell v. Department of Social Services of
the City of New York8a requires that a municipal defendant must
have been acting pursuant to a custom or policy at the time of the
constitutional deprivation to be found liable.8" Very few municipali-
ties continue to operate institutions that confine mentally disabled
persons and, if a municipality does, it may be an arm of the state
government.88 Similarly, if the state official is involved as a defend-
ant in his official capacity, a state policy or custom is considered the
moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.86 Consequently,
the hope of establishing a constitutional right to treatment is bleak
as most states have statutes affirming some aspect of the right to
treatment of an individual in the least restrictive environment. 87
79. Parillo, 652 F. Supp. at 519 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818) (emphasis in the
original).
80. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 569, 576 (1975), recognizes that an institution cannot constitu-
tionally confine a mentally ill person who is not dangerous and is able to care or be cared for
by others "without more." "Without more" is not defined. Conceivably, if the state treated a
non-dangerous mentally ill person who could care for himself, it may be within the constitu-
tion's constraints and thereby meets the "more" requirement of Donaldson.
81. Parillo, 652 F. Supp. at 1519.
82. 457 U.S. at 800.
83. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
84. Monell's requirement that the constitutional deprivation be affirmatively linked with
the custom or policy of the municipality was an important step in establishing the possibility of
a recovery in a civil rights suit, even where the action was due to an unofficial practice. S.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 349 (1986).
85. Most municipal involvement with the mentally ill is through community programs in
which the person is not confined to an institution.
86. 42 U.S.C. 1983 requires that the deprivation be a result of action "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State." This is echoed in Kentucky v.
Graham, - U.S. - , - , 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3106 (1985).
87. A least restrictive environment is that in which confinement is tailored to minimally
infringe upon an individual's constitutional rights, while simultaneously meeting the interests
of the person and the state. Note, Protecting Liberty Interests: Developments in Vermont's
Mental Health Law as Federal Constitutional Protection Declines, 9 VT. LAW REV. 265, 278
n.109 (1984). See also E. BEis, supra note 3 at 193-98.
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There are other barriers to a civil suit by a mentally disabled
patient besides the unclear status of the right to treatment or the
need for an affirmative link of the state or municipality with a policy
or custom causing the deprivation. The relevant statute of limitations
can be a formidable hurdle for a mentally disabled person since he
may not be aware of a deprivation. The statute typically applied is
that which the state applies in a personal injury claim."
Another hurdle is the possibility of a state having an adequate
postprocedural due process remedy. If the state provides a post-
procedural remedy, due process requirements may have been met.
Therefore, a cause of action pursuant to section 1983 would not be
appropriate since there would not be a constitutional violation. 8 Fur-
thermore, due process requirements may be met in the mental health
setting because periodic reviews90 can equate to a predeprivation
hearing.
Another roadblock to seeking a right to treatment is the elev-
enth amendment. 91 To obtain relief from the state it must be pro-
spective in nature in order to conform to the eleventh amendment
prohibition against suing a state.9 Relief that is prospective in na-
ture, with an ancillary effect on a state treasury, is compatible with
constitutional requirements.9 3 Consequently, to avoid a summary
judgment on eleventh amendment immunity, one must carefully
choose who should be sued and what type of relief should be sought.
C. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) and
the Mentally Disabled's Constitutional Rights
The creation of a clearly established right to treatment for men-
tally disabled persons appears bleak in light of the existing road-
88. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, 252 (1986) noted
Garcia v. Wilson, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). See also Plain v. Flicher, 645 F. Supp. 898, 901
(D.N.J. 1986).
89. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), Burch v. Apalachee Comm. Mental Health
Serv., 804 F.2d 1549, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1986).
90. A periodic review is an evaluation of a mentally disabled person's progress or status
to determine if he/she is suitable for discharge or a less restrictive environment. It is a proce-
dure developed to avoid forgetting a patient and unjustly denying him his freedom. Most states
recognize the need for this procedure, although requirements do vary. B. ENNIS AND L. SIEGEL,
THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS, THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A MENTAL PATIENT'S
RIGHTS, 47 (1973).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. Xl states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
92. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
93. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). An example of an ancillary effect on a
state treasury would be a greater expenditure in the future for the staffing of state institutions,
consistent with the grant of injunctive relief requiring better staff-patient ratios.
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blocks to the successful litigation of such a cause of action. Fortu-
nately, another avenue that will affirmatively enhance the right to
treatment for mentally disabled is available. The Civil Rights of In-
stitutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA)' 4 grants the United States At-
torney General the right to initiate a suit whenever a mentally dis-
abled resident of an institution is being subjected:
to egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive such per-
sons of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States causing such
persons to suffer grevious harm, and that such deprivation is
pursuant to a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoy-
ment of such rights, privileges, or immunities, the Attorney
General, for or in the name of the United States, may institute a
civil action in any appropriate United States district court
against such party for such equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate to insure the minimum corrective measures necessary to in-
sure the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities
95
Prior to this statutory authorization allowing initiation or inter-
vention in civil rights cases involving the mentally disabled, the Jus-
tice Department participated as amicus curiae at the request of at
least ten district courts in suits addressing the rights of institutional-
ized persons. 96 The involvement of the Justice Department 97 was a
great plus because investigational resources, legal expertise, and
technical advice were lent to the plaintiff. However, the Justice De-
partment suffered a substantial setback when it attempted to address
constitutional violations that were occurring in an institution for the
mentally retarded in Maryland. 98 The court dismissed the case be-
cause the government lacked standing to initiate, versus intervene in,
the suit, and it was subsequently affirmed on that basis.99 Again in
1979, an attempt by the Justice Department to address the rights of
institutionalized mentally retarded individuals was thwarted by its
inability to obtain standing in the federal courts.100
94. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a., 42 U.S.C. 1997., also allows the Attorney General to intervene in
cases which have been commenced in court.
96. S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.,
& ADMIN. NEWS 787, 789.
97. Justice Department refers only to the United States Department of Justice.
98. U.S. v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976) affid, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir.
1977).
99. Id.
100. U.S. v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).
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This inability to obtain standing to protect the constitutional
rights of institutionalized persons prompted Congress to provide the
needed statutory authority."' The Senate noted that without statu-
tory authority the Justice Department's ability to select appropriate
cases was limited. Moreover, by waiting to intervene, the Depart-
ment's investigative resources, legal advice, and technical know-how
were under-utilized.10 2 The Senate recognized that in all the previous
suits in which the Justice Department had participated the condi-
tions at the institution were deplorable. 03 The results of the Depart-
ment's efforts, however, were encouraging. Not only did conditions
improve, but state laws were repealed and new laws passed that se-
cured constitutional rights for the institutionalized. 0 4 The Senate
concluded that litigation by the Justice Department was the "single
most effective method for redressing systematic deprivations of insti-
tutionalized persons' constitutional and federal statutory rights."' 0 5
The Attorney General's ability to initiate suits is not without
restraints. 42 U.S.C. Section 1997a permits initiation of a civil ac-
tion when the Attorney General reasonably believes that institution-
alized persons are being subjected to "egregious and flagrant" condi-
tions depriving them of their constitutional rights. The Senate's
grant of authority applies when there " is a pattern or practice of
depriving persons" of their rights. 1 6 An investigation is needed prior
to initiating litigation so that isolated occurrences do not engulf the
Justice Department's resources.
If an investigation reveals a practice or pattern of depriving an
institutional resident of his right, the Attorney General may initiate
litigation. Notice requirements, 07 necessary to ensure that "[s]tate
and local officials will be adequately apprised of the Attorney Gen-
eral's concerns and will have an opportunity to consult with him or
his designee before any complaint is filed,"'' 0 must be met. The no-
tice must include the alleged conditions that violate a resident's con-
101. S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 787, 789.
102. 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 797.
103. Id. at 791.
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id. at 809.
106. Id. at 810. This grant is similar to that given the Attorney General under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other
acts. Id. at 811.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(b). These notice requirements need to be met so that the initia-
tion of a case will not be dismissed. The Justice Department's suit against the State of Hawaii
was dismissed for failure to meet these requirements. U.S. v. Hawaii, 564 F. Supp. 189 (D.
Hawaii 1983).
108. 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 814.
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stitutional rights, the supporting facts, the identity of persons in-
volved, and the minimum measures necessary to remedy the alleged
conditions. 0 9 This notice affords state officials the opportunity to
correct the violations through informal and voluntary measures,
rather than through the more expensive route of litigation. " '
The investigations and initiations of civil actions are reported to
Congress annually.' The annual reports of the Attorney General
have shown a decrease in intervention and a corresponding increase
in the initiation of new investigations and actions." 2 Even though
these investigations have produced very little case law, other than
citations to unpublished orders,"' the contents of the consent decrees
have not gone unnoticed. The Mental and Physical Disability Law
Reporter (MDLR) reports these orders, as well as the politics sur-
rounding this area of the law.
The MDLR noted the influence Youngberg v. Romeo had on
CRIPA's potential when it discussed an internal Justice Department
memorandum to the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights
Division."" The Youngberg decision was applied to CRIPA and in-
vestigations were to focus on violations of one's constitutional rights
to physical safety, to be free from bodily restraints, and to receive
training to ensure one's safety and freedom from restraints." 5 The
Department took this stance as a way of "pulling back from its ac-
tive litigation policy on behalf of mentally disabled residents of insti-
tutions.""' 6 This perception, however, has not been set in stone by
the Justice Department and the policy, despite the internal memo-
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(1).
110. 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 814. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(2) also
required that the state governor receive notice before an investigation is started. This notice
gives the Justice Department the opportunity to inform the state of assistance available from
the federal government and also encourages an informal resolution of the alleged conditions.
II1. 42 U.S.C. § 1997f.
112. This trend toward increased investigations and initiation of civil actions is consis-
tent with the policy of using Justice Department resources efficiently. Telephone interview with
Verlin Hughes, Esquire, Justice Department, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section
(March 1987). See also S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess"'(1979), reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 787; Appendix I.
113. The consent decrees or settlements are filed the same day as the complaint. The
reason there is a citation but no opinion is because of the enforceable judicial order. Telephone
interview with Verlin Hughes, Justice Department, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation
Section (March 1987).
114. 7 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 5 (1983), noted a memorandum of June 24, 1982 from
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights William Reynolds to Arthur Peabody, Acting
Chief, Special Litigation Section. The Special Litigation Section is responsible for the enforce-
ment of CRIPA. S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1979), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 787. See Appendix I.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 8.
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randum, is that Youngberg is a yardstick for use in enforcement.
Conceivably, this policy may be expanded or restricted in the future
depending on case law developments." 7
The use of Youngberg as a yardstick has been evident in decrees
pursuant to CRIPA, which are worded like Youngberg and in in-
creased staffing ratios within the institution. The settlement reached
in United States v. Indiana"8 was applicable to two state mental
hospitals. The principles to be implemented were as follows:
1. All hospital treatment decisions must be consistent with
the exercise of professional judgment by qualified staff.
2. All hospital residents must be provided sufficient daily
medical and custodial care to guarantee their constitutional
rights to safety and freedom from unreasonable bodily
restraints.
3. The hospital's physical environment must be maintained
to protect residents from unreasonable risks to their personal
safety." 9
Compliance with these principles required that the state increase the
number of psychiatrists, psychologists, registered nurses, social work-
ers, and others on the staff. 2'
Similarly, in R.A.J. v. Miller, 2' remedies stipulated to by the
parties included increased staff ratios. The increased staff was neces-
sary not only to protect the patients from harm, but also "because
patients cannot benefit from professional judgment if staff is unavail-
able."'M2  Again, in United States v. Maryland,123 additional staff
was to be hired and training was to be provided to the residents to
protect their safety and their right to be free from bodily re-
straints.124 Requirements in five consent decrees in 1986 reiterated
the need for increased staff ratios and the right to training assured
by Youngberg to protect one's safety and to be free from unreasona-
ble restraint.'25
117. Id.
118. No. IP84-411C (S.D. Ind. April 6, 1984).
119. 8 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 320, 321 (1984) (discussing U.S. v. Indiana, No. IP84-
41 IC (S.D. Ind. April 6, 1984)).
120. Id.
121. No. 3-74-0394-H (N.D. Tex. April 2, May 15, June 22 and July 9, 1984).
122. 8 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 445, 445-46 (1984) (discussing R.A.J. v. Miller, No. 3-
74-0394-H (N.D. Tex. April 2, May 15, June 22 and July 9, 1984)).
123. No. 168-35-9 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 1985).
124. 9 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 104 (1985) (discussing U.S. v. Maryland, No. 168-35-9
(D. Md. Jan. 17, 1985)).
125. U.S. v. South Carolina, No. 3:86-1677-0 (D.S.C. June 24, 1986), cited in 10
MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 285 (1986); U.S. v. Colorado, No. 86-F-1470 (D. Colo. July 10,
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Although the consent decrees obtained by the Justice Depart-
ment pursuant to CRIPA have not fashioned an outright guarantee
to treatment, there have been positive results. An increase in staffing
levels will not only protect the residents' safety and secure a greater
freedom from unreasonable restraint, but it will also provide treat-
ment and care as well. It is difficult to imagine that a better staffed
institution which provides training to safeguard the residents' consti-
tutional rights would not overlap into the area of treatment, espe-
cially since the professional staff is to exercise its judgment in deter-
mining what training is necessary to protect a mentally disabled
person's right to safety and freedom from restraint. The principle of
periodic review, grounded in the constitutional right to procedural
due process, 126 provides further support for this argument.
For example, a periodic review of a resident's need for training
would reveal more than a need for mere behavioral modification if
the resident was not only unmercilessly scratching himself until he
bled,2 7 but also was experiencing physical side effects from a psychi-
atric medication. Treatment of the resident's side effects could easily
be provided by either decreasing the patient's current medication or
prescribing an additional medication that would counteract the side
effects.' 18 The effectiveness of either method of treatment and the
simplicity of effectuating the order illustrate the overlap that the
constitutional right to training would have with the uncertain right
to treatment. The periodic review"' to determine the need for train-
ing would result in therapeutic treatment for the resident that would
not pertain to either safety or the right to be free from restraints.
Notwithstanding the possibility that a consent decree might pos-
itively influence a resident's treatment, a decree cannot assure rights
1986), cited in 10 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 355 (1986); U.S. v. Connecticut, No. N-86-252 (D.
Conn. July 25, 1986) cited in 10 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 355 (1986); U.S. v. Michigan, No.
86-CV-73321 DT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 1986), cited in 10 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 355 (1986);
U.S. v. Illinois, No. 86-C-7520 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1986) cited in 10 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP.
538 (1986).
126. See Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 699 n.I I (E.D. Pa. 1985).
127. In such a situation a restraint of soft mittens for one's hands would not be unrea-
sonable, in light of the need to protect one from physical harm. See Zillman, USE OF SECLU-
SION AND RESTRAINTS, in THE AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 522 (1984).
128. For example, Thorazine, Stelazine and Mellaril are major psychotropic medications
which can produce side effects which are annoying, yet responsive to other medication. These
side effects can include Parkinson type symptoms (shuffling gait, rigidity, mask-like face and
drooling), lethargy and dystonias (contractions of the muscles) of the tongue, jaw, neck and
eye muscles. Administration of anti-Parkinson drugs, such as Cogentin or Artane, in conjunc-
tion with surveillance of the psychotropic dosages can effectively diminish these side effects for
the mentally ill individual. See Beeber, Antipsychotic Medications, in THE AMERICAN HAND-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 549 (1984).
129. See supra note 90.
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unsecured by the constitution. A consent decree is "essentially a con-
tractual agreement subject to continued judicial policing,"130 a com-
promise where "neither litigant obtained all that they had hoped to
gain through litigation."'' 31 Consent decrees produce favorable re-
sults not only because they conserve judicial resources, but also be-
cause they can yield broad, sweeping relief that could not be ob-
tained under federal or constitutional law.' 32 Although the parties to
a consent decree can agree to broad relief, the "District Court's au-
thority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which
the decree is intended to enforce."'33 Consequently, when a decree is
grounded in state law, a federal court cannot enforce that section of
a consent decree.
This concept was addressed by the Supreme Court in Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1J).134 Pen-
nhurst was a state school for the mentally retarded and the subject
of a class action suit by its residents. The residents were granted
injunctive relief because the school's conditions violated their consti-
tutional rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the federal court
granting the injunctive relief did not have jurisdiction over the pen-
dant state claims; therefore, portions of the injunction could not
stand. "I
Portions of the injunction granted in Pennhurst IH were based
on state law supporting a right to the least restrictive alternative.
However, the federal court would be effectively instructing "state of-
ficials on how to conform their conduct to state law"' 3 6 if they en-
forced the injunction. The Court found this to be too great an intru-
sion on "the principles of federalism that underlie the [e]leventh
[a]mendment."'13 7 Because the judge-made principle of pendant ju-
risdiction must bow to the immunity of the eleventh amendment of
the Constitution,' 8" a state claim cannot evade the eleventh amend-
130. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1982).
131. Id. (citing Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977) and Flinn v.
FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975)).
132. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 555. Of note is that 42 U.S.C. § 1997 disclaims any promulga-
tion of federal standards of care via CRIPA. This is significant because the broad relief ob-
tained in a consent decree cannot be turned around to support a finding of a federal standard
of care.
133. Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576 n.9 (1984) rev'd, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.
1982). It is important to make the distinction between a consent to a broad sweeping decree
and the enforcement of a broad sweeping decree for this reason.
134. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
135. Id. at 121.
136. Id. at 106.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 121.
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ment immunity by being appended to a constitutional claim.
Lelsz v. Kavanagh139 involved a consent decree that granted a
right to habilitation in the least restrictive alternative for the resi-
dents of a mental retardation facility. The basis for the least restric-
tive alternative was noted as Texas state law by the district court
order pertaining to the decree. 140 The Fifth Circuit recognized that
the district court order granting this right could not be upheld be-
cause no constitutional right to a least restrictive alternative existed.
The order opposed the Supreme Court's ruling in Pennhurst H.1"'
The section of the decree that was grounded solely in state law could
not be enforced because it would be the equivalent of instructing the
state on how to conform its conduct to its own laws. Accordingly, the
Lelsz court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded
the case." 2
The Lelsz court discussed the application of the Pennhurst H
decision, stating:
The only legitimate basis for federal court intervention,
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment is the vindication of
federal rights. If a federal court remedy unfounded in federal
law intrudes into the governance of matters otherwise presided
over by the states, no federal right has been vindicated. The
right and remedy are not severable-in terms of the principle
behind the Eleventh Amendment, they go hand in hand."4"
Thus, although a constitutional claim may remain cognizable, the
state claim will be extinguished. This result makes the choice of a
state or federal forum particularly important depending on what
rights are of paramount concern to the plaintiff or class of plaintiffs.
A state forum may be the most attractive, because it can enforce
constitutional, federal, and state law rights. 44
D. Conclusion
Although mental health patients or activists may be disheart-
ened when considering the right to treatment, progress has been
made. CRIPA has been unable to obtain a consent decree embody-
ing an outright guarantee to treatment, but consent decrees do inevi-
tably improve the conditions within an institution. Furthermore, just
139. 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987).
140. Id. at 1248.
141. Id. (citing Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).
142. 807 F.2d at 1255.
143. Id. at 1252.
144. 10 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 261 (1986).
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because a decree cannot enforce state law rights, the Justice Depart-
ment is not prohibited from seeking the incorporation of state law
rights into the consent. After all, recognition of a right is a better
starting point than base zero and states do voluntarily upgrade con-
ditions on their own on occasion.
Civil rights litigation by the mentally disabled contains some
footholds for a creative advocate. Youngberg may be the last word
from the Supreme Court, but it pertains to the mentally retarded,
not the mentally ill. As such, the mental health advocate must re-
member that Donaldson v. O'Connor has not been overruled. Also,
deference to a professional's judgment, as required by Youngberg
may not be the drawback it was envisioned to be. Pride in a profes-
sion coupled with better staffing ratios can be quite a morale booster
and result in professional judgments recommending voluntary com-
pliance with constitutional and state rights. In addition, these judg-
ments may be enforced by courts that consistently strive to enhance
the plight of the mentally disabled.
Harlow is not the deathblow to civil rights that it might appear.
The difficulty of clearly establishing a constitutional right to treat-
ment to avoid a summary judgment is not equatable with the stagna-
tion of the rights of a mentally disabled person. A state court forum
might still be available for a plaintiff. This may be an auspicious last
resort because relief can be provided for not only constitutional vio-
lations, but also for rights secured by state laws.
III. Obtaining the Necessary Zoning Approval for Group Homes
in Pennsylvania
A. Historical Perspective
Mentally ill and mentally retarded individuals have been rele-
gated to institutions for care and custody for decades. Beginning in
the 1970s, a movement was started to deinstitutionalize these
individuals.
Deinstitutionalization entailed the release of mentally disabled
persons from an institution when their condition did not necessitate
either the medical care, restriction or supervision that was provided.
The mentally disabled were then placed in a community living ar-
rangement. This community environment, known as the least restric-
tive alternative, was actually a treatment modality. The community
arrangement was supposed to be a more humane approach to caring
for the mentally disabled. It was also meant to provide the mentally
disabled with an opportunity to learn to cope with the real world and
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to attain the highest level of independence conceivable for the indi-
vidual. The socialization and habilitation 14 5 to be gained by this type
of living arrangement was all the more praiseworthy in light of the
fact that these persons could exercise and enjoy some constitutional
rights for the first time.146
The deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill and mentally re-
tarded was praised by mental health practitioners and the govern-
ment. The mental health practitioners recognized the multiple bene-
fits to be gained by this approach. The financial savings made the
government very receptive to this trend. The public, however, did not
respond with equal exuberance. The public's cool reaction to this
concept was based largely on the fear of a community house for the
mentally disabled being located in their neighborhood. These com-
munity living arrangements, or group-homes, were often resisted be-
cause of a perceived danger to the community and the possibility of
a precipitous drop in property values.
The public's resistance is one of many hurdles to be overcome in
establishing a group home. Although educating the public about the
purpose and operation of a group home may temper the ill-feelings
prompted by a proposed group home, other obstacles, such as fund-
ing and administrative requirements, 47 are not as easily overcome.
Both may entail obtaining local zoning and hearing board approval.
Zoning and hearing board, approval may be a substantial factor
in determining whether a group home can operate in a given area.
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code' 4 8 allows the gov-
erning body of each municipality to enact zoning ordinances 4 " that
accomplish the Code's purposes. Among the Code's purposes are the
protection and promotion of the public's safety, health and morals as
well as "a coordinated development of municipalities."' 50 Addition-
ally, the zoning ordinances may include:
(1) Provisions for special exceptions and variances adminis-
tered by the zoning hearing board, which provisions shall be in
accordance with this act;
145. Habilitation is a term of art which means that the mentally disabled residents of a
CLA or group home are learning skills that will equip them to dress and care for themselves,
live with others in a home-like environment and handle the tasks attendant to living and man-
aging a home in a community.
146. Summary, Analysis and Commentary, 7 MENTAL DISAB. L. REP. 375 (1983).
147. Summary, Analysis and Commentary, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISAB. L. REP. 6
(1984).
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 1001-11202 (Purdon 1972).
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10601 (Purdon 1972).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10605 (Purdon 1972).
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(2) Provisions for conditional uses to be allowed or denied
by the governing body after recommendations by the planning
agency, pursuant to express standards and criteria set forth in
the ordinances;'5 1
Consequently, if a group home is not within the uses expressly per-
mitted by the zoning ordinance of a municipality, a special excep-
tion, variance or conditional use, if incorporated in the locality's zon-
ing plan, may still entitle the group home to operate.
The coordinated development of a municipality is often achieved
by cumulative zoning ordinances. 152 This type of zoning creates a
hierarchy of land uses. Usually, single family dwellings are at the
apex of the hierarchy, creating a purely residential district. As the
preferred land use in that district other land uses cannot infringe.
For example, the Supreme Court noted in Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co.,' 53 that zoning ordinances of this type may act to
exclude other land uses to preserve the residential nature of a district
because of a "substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare."""'
B. Group Home Zoning Approval as a Family Unit
Unfortunately, group homes that seek to provide a family type
environment for their residents and to assist in their normalization
may not be permitted to do so in a residential neighborhood because
of the zoning ordinance in effect. If challenged, however, the pro-
moter of a group home is not without recourse. The promoter should
take the position that his residents constitute a family as defined by
the ordinances that create the preferred single family residential dis-
trict. Therefore, the group home would not be violating any ordi-
nances and may begin or continue to operate.
Many of the municipalities that have single family dwellings as
the preferred land use of a district failed to define "family" beyond
equating it with a group of persons who are living together as a sin-
gle housekeeping unit. 5 5 Consequently, litigation addressing the
right of a group home to exist centered on the family aspects of the
group. This yielded a body of interpretive law that lent itself to the
premise that a group home can be a family-type unit.
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10603 (Purdon 1972).
152. R. ANDERSON, LAW OF ZONING IN PENNSYLVANIA § 8.12 (1982).
153. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
154. Id. at 395.
155. R. ANDERSON, supra note 152, at §§ 8.24.
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The promoter of a group home was able to commence opera-
tions in Meadville, Pennsylvania, by arguing that the home was the
equivalent of a family unit. In In Re Zoning Appeal of Bethesda
Social Services,5 6 the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas
found that a group home for eight mentally retarded adult males
and two staff persons could be established. The group home met the
ordinance definition of family and the court noted that "the sole pur-
pose of the group home is to establish a residential, not an institu-
tional setting."' 57 The ordinance, it stressed, "was designed to re-
strict the area to a place where people live not to regulate who lives
there.' 5 8 Therefore, these individuals could not be excluded because
they were retarded as long as they qualified as a family.
The focus on the functional nature of the group home was also
the approach taken by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas
in Paxtang Borough v. Keystone Residences, Inc.' 59 In that case, the
borough challenged a married couple's ability to reside in their house
with their natural child and three unrelated mentally retarded chil-
dren. The borough asserted that the occupants of this house were not
a family and therefore were violating the ordinance. The court rec-
ognized that since the ordinance did not define the term "family," it
was entitled to its broadest interpretation. The couple could reside in
that area because there were "sufficient significant characteristics of
a family . . .[in] serving the same purpose in educating and nour-
ishing the young in a family atmosphere of love and care." 6 ' Addi-
tionally, the court found that the money the couple received for the
care of the three unrelated children did not change the fact that the
group was the functional equivalent of a family.
Group homes that did not get past the planning stage in the late
1970s failed because they were not the equivalent of a family unit.
In Pennsylvania George Jr. Republic v. Zoning & Hearing Board of
Coolspring Township,'6' the court found that a proposed home for
delinquent boys was institutional in nature and therefore was not a
dwelling for a family. A foster home for six troubled adolescents was
also held to be institutional in nature in Wengert v. Zoning Hearing
Board."6 2 In Wengert, the court noted that the home would not be
156. In Re Appeal of Bethesda Lutheran Social Services, 114 Crawford 235 (1976).
157. Id. at 240.
158. Id.
159. 100 Dauphin 477 (1978).
160. Id. at 486.
161. 37 Pa. Commw. 151, 389 A.2d 261 (1978).
162. 51 Pa. Commw. 79, 414 A.2d 148 (1980).
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residential or similar to that of a normal family. The institutional
improvements to the building, the presence of a staff, and the fact
that there were several sets of foster parents, were the primary rea-
sons for this conclusion.
The litigation concerning group homes today can be traced back
to the 1960s. The advent of new living arrangements in the 1960s
prompted action by some local boards to deter the communal living
style of many young persons. The local boards acted by redefining
"family." No longer would any group of persons living together as a
single housekeeping unit constitute a family in many municipalities.
The redefinition now typically specified a "family" as persons related
by "affinity or consanguinity, or a limited number of unrelated per-
sons" 163 living in one household. Consequently, a whole new era of
litigation arose concerning the establishment of a group home.
This new litigation focused on whether the group home met the
new definition of family, now limited in number with regard to unre-
lated persons. Some group home promoters took note of this limita-
tion on the number of unrelated persons. In an effort to expedite
gaining zoning board approval, these promoters limited the number
of group home residents to that specified by the ordinance. Compli-
ance with the ordinance requirements, however, was not always
enough to get the promoters over the hurdle of zoning board ap-
proval. Again, group homes for the mentally disabled and handi-
capped met resistance and were challenged on the basis that the
group of residents did not meet the definition of family.
In Allied Services for the Handicapped v. Zoning and Hearing
Board of Scranton,164 a promoter, in planning a group home, com-
plied with the ordinance limitation of no more than five unrelated
persons. Nevertheless, the board denied the promoter's application
for a building permit on the basis that the home would not qualify as
a permitted use. On appeal, the case was remanded for further find-
ings. Specifically, the lower court was to determine if the proposed
five residents would be living together as a household within the or-
dinance definition. The commonwealth court recognized that the
number of unrelated persons was not at issue, rather it was the na-
ture of the group that would be residing in the home. The common-
wealth court then set forth several factors it found pertinent to deter-
mining if the group would be a household. These factors included:
"whether the occupants would make decisions collectively, or under
163. R. ANDERSON, supra note 152, at § 8.24.
164. 73 Pa. Commw. 558, 459 A.2d 60 (1983).
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a single head or manager; the length of stay of the individuals;
whether they would conduct their lives independently; and whether
they would buy, cook, and eat their meals together. 165
In Appeal of Miller,66 a home for the aged, physically handi-
capped and mentally retarded was found to be functionally
equivalent to a single household after an evaluation of many of the
factors cited in Allied Services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted that the record offered evidence of a home where the residents
lived together as a traditional family unit. The residents lived,
cooked, socialized and celebrated holidays together and enjoyed
equal access to all areas of the house. Although some residents did
not stay for substantial periods of time, the court stated that the
focus "should be directed to the quality of the relationship during
the residency rather than its duration." 6 " Furthermore, the fact that
residents paid a fee for the accommodations did not transform the
functional relationship, unless it became apparent that there was a
profit motive as the basis for the relationship. The court concluded
that the group home could exist as a lawful nonconforming use. Al-
though the residents were not a biologically related family, the court
determined that this grouping of individuals was not "incompatible
with the concept of 'family.' "168
This functional analysis of the group home unit by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court was recognized by the commonwealth court in
Jalc Real Estate Corp. v. Zoning & Hearing Board of Lower Sal-
ford Township.6 9 In that case, Jalc used a house as a group home
for four mentally retarded women in an area zoned for single family
detached dwellings. After receiving a cease and desist order regard-
ing this use of the house from the zoning board, Jalc appealed. The
board argued that although there were only four unrelated residents,
a number within the requirements of the ordinance, the necessary
staff for the home transformed the unit into an institutional setting
and thus violated the Township's ordinance.
The Jalc court dismissed this argument by quoting an earlier
165. Id. at 563-64, 459 A.2d at 62.
166. 511 Pa. 631, 515 A.2d 904 (1986).
167. Id. at 640, 515 A.2d at 909.
168. Id. This paper does not address group homes that receive zoning approval as a
nonconforming use. This is an approach that can be taken. A nonconforming use may be
obtained when such use does not currently comply with an ordinance's use provisions, but such
use was lawfully in existence prior to the enactment of the ordinance now in effect. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10107(13.1) (Purdon 1972). See also United Cerebral Palsy Assn. v.
Zoning Bd., 382 Pa. 67,114 A.2d 33 (1955).
169. - Pa. Commw. - , 522 A.2d 710 (1987).
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opinion which stated that support staff were analogous to nonresi-
dent maids, gardeners or housekeepers servicing a residential
home. 7 ' Therefore, the ancillary staff did not transform the nature
of the home to an institutional setting. The court then adopted the
Appeal of Miller conclusion that a group of handicapped persons
could be compatible with the concept of family. Accordingly, Jalc's
use of the house was permitted and the affirmation of the board's
cease and desist order was reversed.
C. Alternative Zoning Options: Special Exceptions and Variances
This functional analysis of the nature of the unit is important to
the determination not only of whether the unit meets the definition
of family, but also of whether the unit may obtain zoning approval
by an alternative zoning option. Alternative zoning options allow a
zoning board to grant a group home leave to begin or to continue
operation even though the group home is technically not permitted in
that zoned area. The alternative options available are special excep-
tions, variances, conditional uses and nonconforming uses.171 In an
effort to obtain zoning board approval, group homes have utilized
special exceptions and variances. The inability to obtain such ap-
proval has, in turn, resulted in litigation. These cases have pointed
out the distinction between the two options and the benefits to be
gained by requesting a special exception, as opposed to a variance.'
A zoning board grants a special exception when the contem-
plated land use is consistent with that envisioned by the ordinance. A
group home promoter who is applying for a special exception, must
demonstrate to the board that the contemplated land use complies
with all the objective requirements of the ordinance. If the promoter
meets this burden of proof, the protesting party must then show that
the proposed land use will conflict with the objectives of the ordi-
nance, or will have a detrimental effect on the public's health, safety
or welfare. If the protesting party can meet this burden then the
board may justifiably deny the special exception. Otherwise, the spe-
cial exception must be granted as a matter of law.
The promoter's burden of proof when applying for a special ex-
ception is much lighter than when applying for a variance. A vari-
170. Id. at , 522 A.2d at 712 (citing Philadelphia Center for Developmental Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 89 Pa. Commw. 591, 492 A.2d 1191 (1985)).
171. Conditional and nonconforming uses will not be addressed in this paper. See Sulli-
van v. Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1488 (W.D. Pa. 1985) for a case addressing a conditional use
and a group home for recovering alcoholics.
172. See cases cited infra notes 175 and 176.
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ance application requires the promoter to show that, without the va-
riance, he is unable to utilize his land at all and is therefore
experiencing an unnecessary hardship. An application for a variance
places a heavy burden on the promoter because the contemplated use
is one that is prohibited by the ordinance. Therefore, the variance is
only justified if the landowner can show the exceptional circum-
stances indicative of the hardship.
In Children's Aid Society v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,11 3 a
special exception enabled a family with six foster children to reside
in a district in Philadelphia where households were limited to no
more than three unrelated persons. Initially, the board refused the
Society's application, finding that the Society had not met the bur-
den of proof necessary to grant a special exception as set forth in the
Philadelphia Zoning Ordinances. This decision was reversed on ap-
peal. The Society successfully argued that it met its burden of show-
ing that a house with six unrelated foster children was consistent
with the objectives of the ordinance. Furthermore, the Society ar-
gued that the protesting board had failed to meet its burden because
it could not show any injury or adverse effect on the public's health,
safety and welfare beyond that caused by a family with six related
children. The court recognized that the foster family's house would
be used as a residence in a manner that was harmonious with and
virtually identical to other uses in the neighborhood. This functional
analysis was instrumental in obtaining the eventual approval of the
zoning board. Thus, although the foster family did not fall within the
ordinance definition of family, the fact that the home was equivalent
to a family unit required that the board grant the exception.
A functional analysis of the nature of a group home for six
mentally retarded adults also proved significant in Allegheny Valley
School v. Zoning Hearing Board of Slippery Rock Borough. "
There, a group home for the mentally retarded did not qualify as a
family because of the ordinance limitation of two unrelated persons
per household. Consequently, the promoter analyzed the special ex-
ceptions incorporated into the ordinance and applied for a special
exception as an eleemosynary institution. 7" The board initially re-
173. 44 Pa. Commw. 123, 402 A.2d 1162 (1979).
174. 102 Pa. Commw. 290, 517 A.2d 1385 (1986).
175. Black's Law Dictionary definition of eleemosynary was used by the commonwealth
court in its interpretation of the statutory term eleemosynary institution. Eleemosynary means
that which relates to or is devoted to charity. Consequently, an eleemosynary institution is a
charitable institution designed to benefit the public from an educational, religious, moral,
physical or social aspect. 102 Pa. Commw. 290, 295, 517 A.2d 1385, 1389 (1986).
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fused the school's application. The common pleas court reversed this
refusal. Affirming the reversal, the commonwealth court found that
the school met the usual and ordinary meaning of an eleemosynary
institution. Furthermore, the court held that the group home was
also the functional equivalent of a single family and therefore was
not a rooming or boarding house. This finding was important be-
cause rooming or boarding houses were conditionally permitted uses
in another district. Finally, the court noted that the board had failed
to present evidence of any adverse effect the group home would have
on the neighborhood which would justify the denial of the special
exception. Again, the functional analysis of the nature of the home
was a factor in obtaining zoning approval.
The different standards applicable to special exceptions and var-
iances are important for purposes of filing the initial application;
moreover, they are significant in obtaining meaningful appellate re-
view. In Appeal of Philadelphia Center for Developmental Ser-
vices,'76 the zoning board applied the standards appropriate to a va-
riance application to the group home's request for a special
exception. As a result, the board denied the special exception holding
that the group home had not met its burden of showing the unique
hardship caused by the zoning ordinance's restrictions. On appeal,
the court noted this error and remanded the matter to the board. In
doing so, the court directed the board to address the nature of the
group home. In particular, ruled the court, the board should have
decided whether the group home constituted a family as defined by
the special exception incorporated into the ordinance. Recognition of
the appropriate standards to be applied provided the promoters of
this group home with a second chance at obtaining the necessary
zoning approval.
D. A Constitutional Basis for Group Home Zoning Approval
The importance of the initial application request is demon-
strated in Hopkins v. Zoning Hearing Board of Abington Town-
ship.177 Hopkins was a fulltime houseparent for three mentally re-
tarded children in an area that limited the number of unrelated
persons per household to two. Hopkins sought zoning approval by
requesting a variance instead of a special exception. The board de-
nied the variance. The denial was affirmed because Hopkins did not
meet his burden of proving unnecessary hardship due to the enforce-
176. 76 Pa. Commw. 1, 462 A.2d 962 (1983).
177. 55 Pa. Commw. 365, 423 A.2d 1082 (1980).
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ment of the zoning ordinance restrictions. Hopkins, however, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the ordinance and subsequently suc-
ceeded in gaining zoning approval.
Specifically, Hopkins challenged the definition of family that
limited the number of unrelated persons to two. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that this restriction had no rational relationship
to the state interest of preserving the neighborhood's residential
character. The court distinguished this case from Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas7 8 which upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance
similar to the one at issue. The Hopkins court noted that Belle Terre
involved six unrelated students, as opposed to houseparents and three
mentally retarded children who were a functional family unit. Be-
cause the Hopkins' house would promote the very values promoted
by the ordinance, the court held that no rational relationship be-
tween the exclusionary ordinance and the state interest was present.
Thus, the ordinance was unconstitutional.
Once again, a functional analysis of the nature of the group
often positively influences the ability of group homes to obtain zon-
ing board approval. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used a ra-
tional basis test in 1980 to determine the constitutionality of the Ab-
ington Township ordinance. In 1985, the United States Supreme
Court held that the rational basis test is the proper level of scrutiny
to afford an ordinance that adversely affects the mentally retarded.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,179 the ordinance in
question required that a group home for the mentally retarded must
have a special use permit to operate. The promoter of a group home
challenged this requirement alleging that it violated the mentally re-
tarded's right to the equal protection of the law. The district court
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. On appeal the circuit
court reversed. The circuit court applied a heightened level of scru-
tiny to the ordinance because it viewed the mentally retarded as a
quasi-suspect class.' 80 On appeal to the Supreme Court the ordi-
nance was held to be unconstitutional as applied.
The Court in Cleburne refused to hold the mentally retarded as
a quasi-suspect class, one that would warrant heightened scrutiny of
the ordinance. The Court noted that there are reasons for the differ-
ent treatment accorded the mentally retarded and that there has
been an effort by both state and federal government to act to protect
178. 416 U.S. I (1974).
179. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
180. Id. at 446.
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and respond to the needs of the mentally retarded. 181 Accordingly,
the mentally retarded did not need to be designated as a quasi-sus-
pect class. This group was already being protected by legislative ac-
tion. Such protection would continue by requiring that "legislation
that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. '"182
The Cleburne court then utilized the rational basis test and
found that the city lacked a rational basis for believing that the
group home would threaten the government's legitimate interest of
controlling the population and traffic in the area. The Court noted
that the group home was similar to other permitted uses such as
boarding houses and apartment buildings. Because these other uses
faced no similar restriction, the Court found no rational basis for the
ordinance requiring a special use permit for the mentally retarded.
The other uses served to congest and populate the area as much if
not more than a group home with thirteen mentally retarded resi-
dents would. Hence, the ordinance was unconstitutional.
E. Conclusion
In conclusion, the promoter of a group home for the mentally
disabled has three legitimate arguments to assert in an effort to gain
zoning board approval. These arguments are: that the unit is the
functional equivalent of family as defined by the ordinance; that the
unit is functionally equivalent to the permitted uses in the zoned
area despite its failure to comply with the ordinance; and that the
city or municipality is without a rational basis for believing that a
legitimate state interest will be achieved by the restrictions imposed
by the ordinance. Each of these arguments benefits from a functional
analysis of the nature of the group home and its similarities to other
permitted uses in an area. Accordingly, the promoter of a group
home should analyze not only the nature of the home, but also the
uses permitted in the area chosen for the home. This analysis will
provide the groundwork for any future court battles and will possibly
assist the promoter in initially applying for the proper alternative
181. The Fifth Circuit's earlier determination that the mentally retarded were a quasi-
suspect classification was a plus for the promoter of the group home. This classification spelled
success because the heightened level of scrutiny showed that the "ordinance was invalid on its
face because it did not substantially further any governmental interests." 473 U.S. at 438.
182. The Court recognized that one of the basic reasons the mentally retarded are
treated differently is because of their "reduced ability to cope with and function in the every-
day world." 473 U.S. 432, 441. This reason spurred legislation, which was enacted to protect
the mentally retarded and guarantee them certain rights pertaining to their care and treat-
ment. See supra notes 5, 6, 17, 90 and accompanying text.
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zoning option.
F. Zoning Approval and Alternative Community Living
Arrangements
Admittedly, mental health advocates may be discouraged by the
1986 Cumberland County decision of Markley v. Carlisle Zoning
Hearing Board (Markley /).183 In Markley I, a mental health center
attempted to obtain zoning approval for the use of eight apartment
units in an apartment building located in a high density residential
district in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The mental health center had pro-
posed that seven of the apartments would be used for nineteen full
care chronic psychiatric patients and the eighth apartment would be
an office for various staff persons. Initially, the zoning board ap-
proved this use. The board viewed "the occupancy of these clients in
the Bellaire Apartments as individual family units" ' 184 within the or-
dinance definition of family. Therefore the board held the occupancy
of the apartments was by right and did not require a variance.
On appeal to the Cumberland County court, a citizens group
argued that the individuals were not living independently as family
units. If the court had accepted this argument, the proposed use
would violate the ordinance as the definition of apartment building
focused on families living in dwelling units independently of each
other. The Cumberland County court did not agree with this argu-
ment and affirmed the board's decision. The court did, however, re-
verse the order of the board. The court held that the staff apartment
was not consistent with the apartment building definition that con-
templates that the occupants "live" in those quarters.
In Markley I, the staff apartment would not be the residence of
any one staff member. As a result, the court found that the staff
apartment changed the nature of the use of the apartments from
residential to institutional. As an institutional use was not permitted
except in an institutional district, the court reversed the board's or-
der permitting the mental health patients and staff to rent and oc-
cupy the units.
This decision was appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court (Markley 11).185 The commonwealth court affirmed the Mark-
ley I holding that the mental health patients living in each apart-
183. 36 Cumb. L.J. (1986).
184. Id. at 577.
185. Markley v. Carlisle Zoning Hearing Board (Markley 11), - Pa. Commw. -,
527 A.2d 595 (1987).
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ment unit were equivalent to family units. The staff apartment then
became the focus of the case. The commonwealth court remanded
the case for further findings regarding whether the staff apartment
would be consistent with the accessory uses' 6 of the apartment
building as defined by the ordinance. If the lower court determined
that the staff apartment was an accessory use, the proposed use of
the eight apartments in the building could be approved.
Markley is significantly distinguishable from the cases address-
ing zoning and group homes for the mentally disabled. First, this
case deals with a totally different community living arrangement.
Second, the staff in Markley would be occupying a unit separate and
apart from the other family units. Consequently, mental health advo-
cates should not view Markley I or II as a step backward. If any-
thing, the cases reaffirm the concept that mentally disabled persons
can constitute a family and adapt to a community lifestyle.
Additionally, Markley I joins many of the group home cases
which recognize that the mentally disabled should be entitled to live
in the community. The Pennsylvania courts have supported this pre-
mise by requiring that zoning boards apply the proper standards to a
zoning application and that municipalities have a rational basis for
their zoning ordinance. Now, by directing that the zoning board or
lower court determine if the staff apartment is an accessory use, the
commonwealth court is also requiring that a municipality's entire
zoning plan be considered when making these determinations. Again,
the Pennsylvania court system is giving a second chance to the men-
tally disabled and their right to live in a community environment.
Dawn L. Moomaw
186. An accessory use is a use clearly incidental to, and customarily found in connection
with, a particular principal use. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11010 (Purdon 1972).
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APPENDIX I
The chart below compiles the figures
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MH = Mental Health Facility
MR = Mentally Retarded Facility
Figures from:
1981 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 126.
1982 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 159.
1983 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 136.
1984 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 147.
1985 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 167.

